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Often a decade or more passed before new features, such as long-distance direct dialing and 
touch-tone phones, would finally percolate throughout the system…Perhaps the most egregious 
example of the company’s technological conservatism was the languid introduction of electronic 
switching, conceived in the 1930s…. The noisy, clunky relays [of the old technology] opened and 
closed circuits to establish continuous physical connections between any two phones. A solid-
state switch, on the other hand, would have no moving parts, making it smaller, faster, quieter, 
and more reliable. Although electronic switches based on solid-state components had been 
developed by 1959, AT&T didn’t introduce the first digital switch into the Bell System until 1976. 
And electronic switching was still being gradually rolled out well into the 1980s… 
      -  Historian M. Riordan (2005) 
 
1. Introduction 
During the 20th century, AT&T was known both for its development of new technologies and 
needless delay in deploying them. For example, AT&T waited for twenty years to introduce both 
the handset and dial system and the automatic phone (Dunford 1987). Delayed deployment of 
new technologies is surprising, given the fact that development costs had been sunk. Further, 
AT&T faced competitors and potential entrants in different markets all this time.  From the very 
beginning Western Union was a rival in the long distance communications market though over 
time AT&T steadily gained domination.1  However, once Western Union for all intents and 
purposes disappeared as a rival to AT&T, new ones began to appear in the long distance market: 
MCI (Microwave Communications, Inc.) followed by Datran (Data Transmission Company).   
AT&T also faced competition at the local level from other phone service providers.  
“When Alexander Graham Bell's patents expired in 1893, AT&T was faced with the entry of 
competitors into its market. The newcomers, known collectively as the Independents, appeared 
first in small cities and towns in the Midwest, but quickly spread out across the nation and into 
                                                   
1 “What tied the failure of Western Union to the success of Bell was a porous and shifting boundary between 
telegraphy and telephony, between what twentieth-century managers and regulators would later call the record and 
voice communications industries. Through the contract of 1879, Western Union attempted to keep Bell out of the 
long-distance communications market, which Western Union's managers viewed as the exclusive province of 
telegraphy….While regulators propped up Western Union as the only competitor to AT&T, by the 1960s it was 
offering only token competition.” Hochfelder (2002) 
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larger cities” (Nix and Gabel 1993).  The independents remained through the 20th century, some 
outlasting AT&T itself.  Interestingly, AT&T’s main approach to deterring entry was by 
“developing its long-distance network and through patent litigation against its competitors” (Nix 
and Gabel 1993).  Furthermore, the Kingsbury Commitment (1913) restricted AT&T from 
acquiring the independents and forced it to provide long-distance service to independents 
(Galambos 1992). Given that AT&T faced potentially entry from independents that it could not 
buy out, its delay in introducing superior, patented technology seems even more surprising.   
Further, AT&T is not the only company that has allegedly delayed the introduction of a 
new technology.   For example, GE delayed the introduction of fluorescent bulbs until a small 
rival (Sylvania) began producing them (Dunford 1987).  IBM too had been accused of delaying 
introducing new main frames until rivals had finally entered the market with the old technology 
(Scherer 2007).  
In this paper we examine the optimality of delayed introduction of new technology for 
AT&T’s, IBM’s or any incumbent monopolist. Given the choice between an old technology and 
a newly patented, lower cost technology, it is clear that a monopolist under normal circumstances 
would choose the new technology. We show however that, when facing a potential entrant 
having access only to the old technology, an incumbent may have an incentive to shelve the new 
technology even if it is more efficient.   
Broadly, this phenomenon occurs when a new technology or product is distinct from the 
old one and there is technology-specific production uncertainty. In such a case, when the 
incumbent uses the old technology that is available to the entrant, both the incumbent and the 
entrant are exposed to common cost shocks.  If instead the incumbent chooses a new, 
unconnected technology, then they are exposed to independent cost shocks. As a result, with the 
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introduction of a new technology, an incumbent inadvertently shields an entrant from the shocks 
the incumbent faces. In duopolistic competition this shielding raises the expected profit for the 
entrant, thereby making entry more appealing.  
To see why this is so intuitively, consider what occurs when an entrant happens to draw a 
low cost and increases its output. If the incumbent uses the old technology, the incumbent too 
draws the same low cost realization and increases output.  On the other hand, if the incumbent 
uses the new technology its cost realization is uncorrelated to the entrant’s, and so the incumbent 
is less likely to be increasing output. Thus, the use of the common technology correlates the 
firms' strategies.  Further, as we show below, correlations of strategies make the profit function 
less convex, thereby reducing expected profits for the entrant. As a result, the incumbent may 
find it easier to deter entry with the old technology, even though it has access to a new and more 
efficient technology. Thus, while technology adoption as entry deterrence is not new in the 
literature (e.g., if the new technology has lower cost, the incumbent can undercut potential 
entrants), we bring a new perspective to it by emphasizing the role that cost uncertainty plays.2   
Two points are worth emphasizing regarding suppression of innovations as a method of 
entry deterrence. First, what drives our result is not risk aversion but the correlations of strategies 
induced by a technology choice. To show this we assume risk neutrality of both firms. Secondly, 
unlike in previous work in strategic competition, our result holds whether the firms compete in 
quantities or in prices. We demonstrate this by showing that both Cournot and Hotelling price 
competition yield the same qualitative result. 
 In the next section, we briefly review the related literature.  In section 3, we consider the 
standard model of quantity competition – Cournot competition – in a model in which the 
                                                   
2 In Ellison and Ellison (2007) entry costs for the potential entrant are stochastic, but this plays a role in making the 
effect of the incumbent’s choice of investment continuous.   
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incumbent first chooses its technology and then the entrant chooses whether to enter with the old 
technology. In section 4, we consider price competition in the classic Hotelling model, finding 
that our result does not qualitatively change.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 The literature on entry deterrence under cost uncertainty includes Maskin (1999), 
Waldman (1987) and Harrington (1987). Waldman (1987) considers the effect of uncertainty on 
non-cooperative entry deterrence and in particular its effect on the free rider problem.  As we 
consider a lone incumbent the free rider issue does not arise here.  Harrington (1987) examines 
the effects of uncertainty on entry deterrence when signaling is possible, while signaling cannot 
arise in our model. Closer to our work, Maskin (1999) studies the classic model of capacity 
choice by an incumbent facing a possible entrant, each facing a common cost shock, much as in 
our model when the incumbent chooses the old technology.  He shows that cost uncertainty can 
lead to the incumbent choosing a larger level of capacity to deter entry.  Since we consider 
technology choice instead of capacity choice, the role of cost uncertainty differs: in our analysis, 
by choosing the old technology the incumbent makes the strategies more correlated, lowering the 
entrant’s expected profits.  The incumbent thus benefits from the uncertainty.  In Maskin (1999) 
there is only one technology for the incumbent and the uncertainty forces it to choose a greater 
capacity, making deterrence more costly.  Thus, the uncertainty harms the incumbent. 
 Methodologically, our work is perhaps most closely related to that of Choi and Yi (2000), 
which examines vertical foreclosure and the choice of input specifications under cost 
uncertainty.  In Choi and Yi (2000), there are two upstream firms selling inputs to two 
downstream firms. Each upstream firm can produce a specialized input for one downstream firm 
or a generalized input that can be used by the both downstream firms. The authors show that 
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vertical integration is anticompetitive because an upstream firm would produce the generalized 
inputs in non-integrated vertical structure but, when integrated, it chooses to produce the 
specialized input for its downstream firm, thereby foreclosing the rival downstream firm.  
Although the environments differ, this result hinges, like ours, on the fact that the reduction of 
cost correlation can create a benefit.  Specifically, in Choi and Yi (2000) the upstream firms 
observe cost realizations and then engage in Bertrand competition when producing the 
generalized inputs. As a result, an upstream firm earns zero profits if the rival firm draws the 
same or lower cost realization and captures all of the profit if it has the lower cost realization. 
Producing specialized inputs decreases the probability of both firms having the same cost 
realization and raises expected profits.3  Thus the firms benefit from a reduction in correlation. 
 Our results could also be characterized as raising-the-rival’s-costs strategy (Salop 1979, 
Salop and Shefffman 1983, 1987).4 However, here the means is the choice of technology.  By 
staying with the old technology the incumbent increases the correlation of the strategies, and 
decreases the expected profit to the potential entrant. As a result, the incumbent may choose an 
unpatented inferior technology over its patented new technology.  Thus, the basic structure here 
is the reverse of the effect found in Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Reinganum (1983), where 
the incumbent invents and patents an inferior technology to keep it from falling into the hand of 
the potential entrant.  For the same reason our results are distinct from work on network 
compatibility and entry deterrence in several respects.  For example, since the monopolist in our 
model has the new technology, our result is distinct from the one of the “excess inertia” found in 
Farrell and Saloner (1986) that can lead to predation.  Likewise, there is no network externality 
                                                   
3 As Choi and Yi (2000) note this is also reminiscent of Dasgupta and Maksin’s (1987) result that project portfolios 
are characterized by excessive correlation. 
4 Foreclosure in Choi and Yi (2000) also has the effect of raising the rival’s cost and benefiting the integrated firms. 
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here so the incumbent does not remain with the old system because of the large customer base 
(Katz and Shapiro 1992).  
 
3. Basic environment 
Consider an incumbent monopolist (firm i) under the threat of entry (by firm e).  Assume 
linear demand 
 
 p(Q) = 1– Q 
 
if Q ≤ 1 and p(Q) = 0 otherwise. If there is entry, then the firms produce homogeneous products 
and compete in quantities (i.e., Cournot competition) with aggregate output Q = qi + qe, where qk 
is firm k’s (= i, e) output.  Otherwise, the incumbent retains its monopoly position and so Q = qi. 
    There are two technologies available for production:  an old technology (O), which can 
be used by either firm, and a new technology (N), which is available only to the incumbent.  
Firms adopting either technology are subject to technology-specific cost shocks, which can 
occur, e.g., when the new technology results in a drastically different production process from 
the one under the old technology.   For simplicity, assume that marginal costs are stochastic but 
constant with respect to output.  Let⎯cO denote the expected costs of the old technology and σO2 
its variance.  Analogously, let⎯cN be the expected costs of the new technology and σN2 its 
variance.  The distributions are assumed independent and have support [0, 1), given the 
normalization on the demand function. We emphasize that it is not the cost variability itself that 
drives the result, but rather it is the variability combined with the fact that the firms compete 
strategically. To emphasize this point we assume that the cost variability is identical to the two 
technologies, i.e.,  
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   σO2 = σN2 = σ2.  
 
We do assume however that the new technology is a superior technology in the following sense:  
the expected marginal cost of production is lower with the new technology:⎯cN  ≤⎯cO. We say the 
technology is strictly superior when the inequality is strict.  
 We model the interaction between the firms in four stages.  In the first stage, the 
incumbent chooses (and commits to) its technology, incurring fixed cost Ki. In the second stage, 
the entrant observes the incumbent’s first-stage decision and chooses whether to enter or not; if it 
enters the entrant incurs fixed cost, Ke.  In the third stage, nature draws values for the firms’ 
costs and the firms only observe their own costs.  However, if the firms have the same 
technology, then they can infer each other’s costs from observation of their own.  In the fourth 
stage, if the entrant enters, the firms play a quantity-setting game; otherwise the incumbent 
remains a monopoly. 
 With regards to our assumptions on fixed setup cost we acknowledge that introducing a 
new technological system for an AT&T would not be a trivial exercise.  While presumably it 
would be more costly for AT&T to switch to the new technology, we assume the fixed costs are 
the same between two firms, i.e., Ke = Ki = K. This assumption is imposed to prevent AT&T 
from choosing the old technology for reasons other than the one considered here (i.e., because 
the fixed costs of the new technology is too great), but can be easily relaxed.5    
 What is important is that, if the incumbent chooses the old technology and the entrant 
enters, then the firms face the same cost ex post. On the other hand, if the incumbent chooses the 
                                                   
5 Of course, as with all first mover models, the move (e.g., choosing capacity as in Dixit 1979) needs an irreversible 
aspect to it; ALCOA must have been unable to undo its capacity if rivals entered.  Furthermore, at least in the case 
of AT&T, making the changes to introduce the new technology was a slow process, so even if the potential entrant 
entered, it would take time before AT&T would be able to switch.   
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new technology and the entrant enters with the old technology their cost shocks will be less 
correlated.  Furthermore, they cannot infer each other’s cost realization from observing their 
own, given independence of distributions O and N.   
 
3.   Analysis   
3.A. The fourth-stage game 
 We solve the model backward, starting with the fourth stage. Consider first the subgame 
in which the incumbent chooses the old technology and the entrant enters (and by default is using 
the old technology).  Nature has drawn the cost  %cO  from distribution O, which is common for 
both firms. Since they can infer each other’s cost by observing their own, the firms play a game 
of complete information with identical costs. The equilibrium quantity and operational profit 
(i.e., ignoring fixed costs) for firm j = i, e are therefore 
 
  
 
 = [1 – ]/3, and   q j
O cO
(1)  
 
π jO (c ,c ) =  j k  π j
O ( cO , cO ) =  [1 – ] /9, j ≠ k, cO 2
 
where the superscript O indicates that the incumbent has chosen the old technology. 
 If instead the incumbent chooses the new technology and the entrant enters, then nature 
draws a cost realization  from distribution N for the incumbent and %cN  %cO  from distribution O for 
the entrant. Given independence between O and N, the firms cannot infer each other’s cost 
realization. Thus, the game is one of incomplete information, and we look for a Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium. Firm j maximizes expected profit  
 
  E[(1 – qj – qk – )qc j j]. 
 
The first-order condition can be arranged to yield firm j’s best response  
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  qj = [1 –  – E(qc j k)]/2.      
It is a routine exercise to show that the equilibrium outputs are   
    = [1  – 2qi
N cN  +⎯cO]/3 + [  −⎯ccN N]/6  
    = [1  – 2qe
N cO  +⎯cN]/3 + [  −⎯ccO O]/6 
 
where the superscript N denotes the incumbent choosing the new technology.  Firm j, after 
setting its output, has fourth-stage operational profits of 
 
(2)  
 
π jN ( cc ,j k ) =  {[2 + 3 c  + 3 c  j k –⎯cO N –⎯c ]/6} q . jN
 
  Finally, if there is no entry, the incumbent’s monopoly operational profits are   = (1 – 
)
π MO
cO 2/4 if it chooses the old technology and = (1 – c )π MN N 2/4 with new technology, where the M 
subscript indicates the monopoly.  Note that if there were no potential entrant, then the 
incumbent would select the new technology because its expected profits would be greater. 
 
3.B. Entry Deterrence 
 In stage three Nature moves, revealing the technology-specific cost information to the 
firms only if they chose that technology.  We now turn to the second stage, in which the potential 
entrant makes its entry decision.  
 Suppose that the incumbent chose the old technology in the first stage. Then the expected 
operational profit to the potential entrant is obtained by taking expectations of (1), so the total 
expected profit is  
  
(3)  E[ ]  = E[ ]ΠeN π eO  - K = π eO ( cO , cO )  + σ2/9 – K 
 
where   
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    π eO ( cO ,  cN ) ≡ (1 – cO )
2/9 
is the mean operating profit (i.e., the operating profit if variance equals zero).  
 If the incumbent chose instead the new technology in the first stage, the firms do not 
learn each other’s cost, and hence neither firm reacts to the rival’s cost realizations. It follows 
that the competitor’s cost cannot introduce variance into the firm’s profit.6  Taking expectations 
of (2) yields the entrant’s expected profit 
 
(4)  E[ ] =E[ ] − KΠeN π eN   = (π eN cO , cN )  + σ2/4  – K 
where  
   ( π eN cO , cN ) ≡ [1 – 2 cO  + cN ]2/9 
is the “mean” operation profit, and the variance term corresponds to shocks to the old 
technology.. 
 Comparing the two expected profits for the entrant in (3) and (4), the variance term is 
smaller when the incumbent chooses the old technology. Therefore, if the expected marginal 
costs are identical across technologies, the entrant’s expected profit is smaller when the 
incumbent chooses the old technology. This result stems from two effects entailed by the 
incumbent choosing the same technology that is available to the entrant.   
 First, the exposure to the common cost shocks results in a correlation of the firms’ 
strategies. To understand this effect intuitively, note first that profits are convex in costs.  Now, 
suppose that the entrant has a lower-than-average cost shock and expands its output. If it chose 
the new technology, being uninformed, the incumbent would not react to the entrant having 
drawn a low cost, given that cost shocks are uncorrelated across technologies. With the old 
                                                   
6 This is because the rival’s cost enters the firm’s profit function linearly. 
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technology, however, the incumbent draws the same cost realization that the entrant does. Hence, 
the incumbent also faces the low cost and expands its output as well. With the incumbent also 
expanding output, the entrant’s profit does not increase as much as it does with separate 
technologies. Similar observations obtain when the entrant draws a higher-than-average cost. As 
the incumbent also draws a higher cost and contracts output, the entrant’s profit does not fall as 
much as when the incumbent had chosen the new technology. Thus, the incumbent, by choosing 
the same technology as available to the entrant, makes the entrant’s profits less convex and the 
entrant worse off relative to the choice of the new technology.   
 Second, without correlations in the cost shocks, the entrant would rather the incumbent 
choose the old, less efficient technology; i.e., cN  < cO .  However, as we will show below, this 
preference ranking can be reversed with cost correlations and sufficiently high variance.  That is, 
a potential entrant could prefer the new technology even if that gives the incumbent strictly 
lower expected marginal cost. 
 Comparing the entrant’s expected operational profits in (3) and (4) leads to 
 
  E[ π eN ] > E[ ] ⇔ π eO
(5)  σ2  > (4/5)( cO  –  cN )(2 – 3 cO   + cN ) 
 
In particular, if  cN  = cO , the right-hand side of (5) is zero and so the above inequality holds.   
However, even if  cN  < cO , the above inequality holds if cN  is sufficiently close to cO  or if σ2 is 
sufficiently large.  
 When (5) holds, we have  
 
(6)  E[ ] – K > E[ ] – K. π eN π eO
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Define KB ≡ E[ ] and⎯Kπ eN E ≡ E[ ]. If K∈(π eO EK , KB), then we have 
 
  E[ π eN ] – K > 0 > E[ ] – K. π eO
 
For such values of K, entry is deterred only if the incumbent firm chooses the old technology.  
For this reason, call ( EK , KB) the entry-deterrence set.    
 On the other hand, if K > KB, both sides of (6) are negative, indicating that there will be no 
entry regardless of the incumbent’s technology choice.  This case is known as blockaded entry. If K 
<⎯KE, both sides of (6) are positive, so there will be entry regardless of the incumbent’s technology 
choice. For both these cases (either K > KB or K <⎯KE), the incumbent’s technology choice has 
no effect on the potential entrant’s entry decision, and hence the incumbent clearly will choose 
the new technology. 
 We now determine the incumbent’s decision. To determine when the incumbent would 
choose the less efficient old technology to deter entry we must determine the incumbent’s profit 
with the old technology and compare it with its profit with the new technology.  Given that K is 
in the entry deterrence set, if the incumbent chooses the old technology then it is a monopoly 
(since entry would be deterred) and its operational profit would be  
 
  E[ π MO ] = (1 –  cO )2/4 + σ2/4 
 
On the other hand, choosing the new technology would result in expected operating profit of 
 
  E[ π iN ] = E[ qiN ]
2 = πiN( cN , cO )  + σ2/4   
where  
   ( π iN cN , cO ) ≡ [1 – 2 cN  + cO ]2/9. 
Thus,  
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  E[ π MO ] ≥ E[ ] ⇔   π iN
(7)   0 ≥ (5 – cO  –  4cN )[4( cO  – cN ) – (1 – cO )]/9. 
 
From (7) it is clear that if the two technologies have identical marginal cost, then the incumbent 
selects the old technology.  Moreover, even if the new technology is strictly superior, the 
incumbent still chooses the old technology so long as cN  ∈ cO −
(1− cO )
4
, cO
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .  Finally, if 
introducing a new technology requires a greater fixed cost than keeping the old technology, the 
incumbent will choose the old technology. 
 The next proposition summarizes what we found in this section. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that firms compete in quantities and that the new technology is 
superior to the old technology in that the marginal cost is distributed with a lower expected 
value  cN  ∈ 
 
cO −
(1− cO )
4
, cO
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .   
A. If there is no potential entrant, then the incumbent chooses the new technology. 
B. If there is an entrant and its fixed (entry) cost K satisfies (6), then the incumbent chooses 
the old technology and deters entry. 
 
 We emphasize that what drives the result is not risk aversion; after all, we have assumed 
that both firms are risk neutral.  Rather, our results are driven by the fact that different 
technologies have different cost distributions, combined with the fact that the firms compete 
strategically.  As a consequence, the incumbent could choose the less efficient, older technology 
regardless of whether the older technology is riskier than the new technology.  To emphasize this 
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point we have assumed that the two technologies are equally risky (that is, have the same 
variance since higher order moments do not play a role).   
 This is not to argue that changes in variance (or risk) cannot have effects.  Consider what 
happens if all technologies have an identical increase in variance. To begin with, as an inspection 
can readily confirm, an increase in variance raises E[ ],  expanding the upper bound of the 
entry deterrence set, 
π eN
KB. As a result, the entry deterrence set now contains some higher values of 
K that did not initially belong there.  For those values of K now included in the set, if cN  ∈ 
 
cO −
(1− cO )
4
, cO
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , the incumbent now prefers the old technology while when variance was 
smaller it preferred the new technology.  That is, an increase in variance changes the 
incumbent’s technology choice, not because of risk aversion but because it wants to deter entry.  
 An increase in variance also increases E[ ], thereby raising the lower bound of the 
entry deterrence set,⎯K
π eO
E. Therefore, some low values of K drop out of the set.  For those values 
of K now outside the deterrence set, if cN  ∈ cO −
(1− cO )
4
, cO
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , then the incumbent will change 
the technology choice from the old technology (deterring entry) to the new technology 
(accommodating entry).  However, a further inspection reveals that an increase in variance 
increases E[ ] more than E[ ] so that the entry deterrence set expands. That is, as variance 
is increased, the incumbent is more likely to use the old technology and deter entry.   
 π eN π eO
 
3.C Publicly observed cost shocks 
We have so far assumed that the cost shocks are privately observed.   Consider now what occurs 
if the cost shocks were publicly observed. This does not affect the game when both use the old 
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technology, but now the firms play a game of complete information when using different 
technologies.  Then it is a straightforward calculation to show that both the incumbent’s and the 
entrant’s expected profits are greater with publicly observed costs when using different 
technologies.  (This is a well-known result in the information sharing literature; see, e.g., Gal-Or 
1986 or Vives 1990).   
 While it does not change our result qualitatively, the case of publicly observed cost 
shocks yields two interesting results.  First, E[ ] increases while E[ ] remains unchanged. 
That is, 
π eN π eO
KB rises but⎯KE remains intact, indicating that the entry deterrence set has expanded 
upward. Therefore the incumbent is more likely to use the old technology to deter entry when 
costs are publicly observed.   
 Second, while in quantity competition a firm is normally made better off when its cost 
shocks are publicly observed, in the model here the incumbent could be made worse off when its 
cost shocks are publicly observed.7  To see how the firm could be harmed, recall that KB, the 
upper bound of the entry deterrence set, is increased when the cost shocks become publicly 
observed.   That is, the entry deterrence set now contains some values of K that were not in the 
set when shocks were publicly unobservable.  For those values of K, with publicly observed 
costs, the incumbent must use the old technology to deter entry, and would use the old 
technology if cN  ∈ (1 c )c 4
O
O
−⎛ −⎜⎝ ⎠, cO
⎞⎟ . In contrast, if instead those costs were not publicly 
observable, then for those same values of K the incumbent would be able to keep its monopoly 
position with the choice of the new technology, i.e., entry would be blockaded.   
 
4. Price competition 
                                                   
7 See, e.g., Gal-Or (1986) or Vives (1990). 
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 Often in strategic competition the results hinges critically on the type of strategic 
competition. In this section we examine whether our findings from quantity competition hold 
when firms compete in prices. To that end, we consider the Hotelling model.8    
 Let there be a linear city of unit length with the incumbent located at 0 and the potential 
entrant, if it enters, is located at 1.  Consumers have identical value for the product, v, and linear 
transportation costs t, which are normalize to one.  Assuming the market is “covered,” v > c + 
3t/2, it is straightforward to derive demand (see, e.g., Tirole 1988):  
i
 
  qi = (1 – pj + pk)/2. 
 
Operational profits for firm j are  
 
  πj = (pj − cj)(1 – pj + pk)/2 
 
with its first order condition 
 
(8)   1 – 2pj + pk + cj = 0. 
 
Otherwise, the assumptions (specifically, regarding the cost distributions) are as before.  The 
remainder of the analysis closely follows the steps from the previous section and so we only 
sketch the main points. 
  
4.A The fourth stage  
 Again using backward-induction we start with the fourth stage. In the subgame in which 
the incumbent chooses the old technology and the entrant entered with the old technology, each 
firm has observed the common marginal cost c  and so the fourth stage is a game of complete O
                                                   
8 The standard duopoly model of price competition, which specifies ad-hoc demand functions such as qi = 1 – pj + 
δpk, δ ∈(0,1) has the unattractive implication that profits are greater in a duopoly than in a monopoly. Therefore the 
model is not suited for having a meaningful comparison of the monopoly and the duopoly outcome. 
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information. Using (8), the equilibrium prices and operational profit for firm j = i, e are  
 
   = 1 + , and   Ojp cO
(9)  Ojπ (c ,c ) = j k Ojπ ( cO , cO ) = 1 /2.9
 If instead the incumbent chooses the new technology and the entrant enters, then nature 
draws a cost realization c  from distribution N for the incumbent and c  from distribution O for 
the entrant.  This fourth stage is a game of incomplete information, and following the outline of 
the previous section, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prices are 
N O
 
   = (3 + 2  + Nip cN cO )/3 + ( cN – c )/6 N
   = (3 + 2  + Nep cO cN )/3 + ( cO − )/6 cO
In this case it is convenient to use firm j’s expected fourth stage profits given its cost c (since 
the rival’s cost enters firm j’s profit linearly): 
j
 
(9)  E[ Njπ | c j ] =  ( Njp − )c j 2/2 = (6 – 3 c  + j c j − c ) /72. i 2
 
  Finally, if there is no entry, the incumbent’s monopoly profits are as before: OMπ  = (v – 
)cO 2/4 if it chooses the old technology and NMπ = (v – )cN 2/4 with new technology. 
 
4.B. Entry Deterrence 
 Turning to the second stage, the potential entrant’s expected profits from entering given 
that the incumbent chose the old technology is 
  
                                                   
9 While with the Hotelling model costs do not enter into the profit expression when the same technology is used, the 
qualitative aspect of technology choice (an incumbent by choosing the old technology would lower the rival’s profit) 
would also hold with an ad hoc model such as qi = 1 – pj + δpk, δ∈(0,1).  However, the latter ad hoc model has the 
unattractive implication that profits are greater in a duopoly than a monopoly. 
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(10)  E[ Oeπ ( cO , cO )] = Oeπ ( cO , cO )  =  1/2. 
  
 If the incumbent chooses instead the new technology in the first stage, the firms do not 
learn each other’s cost, and hence neither firm reacts to the rival’s cost realizations.  Taking 
expectations of (9) yields the entrant’s expected profit 
 
(11)  E[ Neπ ]  = Neπ ( cO , cN )  + σ2/8   
where  
  Neπ ( cO , cN ) ≡ (3 – 2 cO + 2 cN )2/18 
is the “mean profit” and the variance term corresponds to the old technology cost term. 
 As with quantity competition, the variance term is smaller when the incumbent chooses 
the old technology and so again, if the expected marginal costs are identical across technologies, 
the entrant’s expected profit is smaller when the incumbent chooses the old technology.  The 
intuition for this follows as with quantity competition.  As a result, the entrant is worse off when 
the incumbent chose the old technology both in price and quantity competition.  This is unusual 
since generally these interactions depend on the type of competition.   
 Comparing the entrant’s expected profits in (9) and (11) leads to 
  E[ Neπ ] > E[ Oeπ ] ⇔  
(12)  σ2  > 4( cO – cN )(6  – cO  + cN )/9.10
As with quantity competition, if cN  = cO , the right-hand side of (12) is zero and so the above 
inequality holds. Even if cN  < cO , (12) holds when cN  is sufficiently close to cO .  When (12) 
holds, there is again a K such that: 
                                                   
10 The condition is σ2  > 24(c c )[2(2+δ) 2c (2 δ )+δ(c +c )] / (2+δ) (4 3δ)O N O O N− − − 2 −  in the ad hoc model where 
demand is specified as qi = 1 – pj + δpk, δ∈(0,1). 
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(13)  E[ Neπ ] – K > 0 > E[ Oeπ ] – K, 
 
that is, for K satisfying the above condition, the entrant does not enter if the incumbent firm 
chooses the old technology, but does enter if the new technology is chosen. 
 Turning to the incumbent, if (13) holds, then when it chooses the old technology the 
incumbent earns the monopoly profit: 
 
  E[ OMπ ] = (v – cO )2/4 + σ2/4,  
while choosing the new technology would result in expected duopoly profit 
 
  [ Niπ ]  = Niπ ( cN , cO )  + σ2/8    
where  
  Niπ ( cN , cO ) ≡ (3 – 2 cN + 2 cO )2/18. 
To begin with, if cN  = cO , then E[
O
Mπ ] ≥ E[ Niπ ] and the incumbent chooses the old technology.  
However, with Hotelling competition, the variance term is greater with the monopoly profits (old 
technology) than with duopoly profits, which makes the old technology even more attractive.  To 
abstract from this effect, let σ2 = 0.  In that case, if v is sufficiently large relative to cO , that is v 
≥ √2 (1 + cO (2+3√2)/6), then even without the variance effect a monopoly with the old 
technology is more profitable than a duopoly with the new technology no matter how efficient is 
the new technology.  However, if v is sufficient small (and the market remains covered), then the 
old technology is still more profitable if cN  ∈ 2 23 ,2 3 2 O
v⎛ ⎞−⎜⎜ +⎝ ⎠
c ⎟⎟  no matter how small σ is. 
 
Proposition 2: In a Hotelling model, suppose that the new technology is superior to the old 
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technology in that marginal cost is distributed with a lower expected value cN  ∈ 
2 23 ,
2 3 2 O
v⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
c .   
A. If there is no potential entrants, then the incumbent chooses the new technology. 
B. If there is an entrant and its fixed (entry) cost K satisfies (13), then the incumbent 
chooses the old technology and deters entry. 
 
Note that, given our discussion preceding the proposition, as σ increases, the lower bound on cN  
decreases.  That is, the condition cN  ∈ 2 23 ,2 3 2 O
v⎛ ⎞−⎜⎜ +⎝ ⎠
c ⎟⎟  is sufficient but not necessary for the 
incumbent to choose the old technology to deter entry. 
 Another similarity with quantity competition is the effect that a uniform increase in 
variance has on the entry deterrence set.  By an analogous logic it can be shown that an increase 
in variance increases the entry deterrence set.  However, with price competition there is a new 
effect: the incumbent’s profits are differently affected depending on its technology choice.   
Specifically, an increase in variance increases the incumbent’s monopoly profits due to deterred 
entry more than it does its duopoly profits due to accommodated entry. As a result, entry 
deterrence is more attractive to a monopolist and so more likely to occur.  Thus, both effects go 
in the same direction: an increase in variance makes entry deterrence more likely.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 While holding a monopoly position during the 20th century AT&T was known for both 
funding a world class research lab and supposedly delaying beyond reason deployment of useful 
innovations from the lab. In this paper we present a new explanation as to why AT&T and other 
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incumbent monopolists, when faced by potential entry, may want to suppress a new and more 
efficient technology they have developed. Our analysis shows that the suppression of new 
technology can occur when it is sufficiently distinct from the old technology such that, should 
the incumbent adopt it and the entrant enter with the old technology, the two firms will be 
exposed to uncorrelated cost or production shocks. That is, when the incumbent chooses the new 
technology, the entrant would be shielded from the cost shocks affecting the incumbent. As a 
result, the entrant finds entry more appealing than when the incumbent keeps the old technology.  
 One question that may remain would be: why then did AT&T, IBM and others spend 
resources on the developing the technologies?  The answer, of course, is that, although they 
would not implement them so long as the old technology could work to deter entry, the 
environments could change in the future.  In particular, when the demand grows sufficiently 
strong, the entrants would choose to enter despite the incumbent’s choice of the old technology, 
at which time the incumbent would introduce the new technology.  And indeed, once the 
competitors made enough inroads, the incumbents such as IBM and GE introduced the new 
technologies. 
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